The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law by Eisenberg, Melvin Aron
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 3 Article 1 
1993 
The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review 
in Corporate Law 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate 
Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437 (1993). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol62/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate 
Law 
Cover Page Footnote 
This Article is based on the Robert E. Levine Distinguished Lecture which I gave at Fordham Law School 
in 1993. I thank Joe Hinsey, Meir Dan-Cohen, and a number of my colleagues who attended a colloquium 
at which I presented an earlier version of this Article, for their valuable comments. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol62/iss3/1 
ARTICLES
THE DIVERGENCE OF STANDARDS OF
CONDUCT AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
IN CORPORATE LAW
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG *
In this Article; Professor Eisenberg examines how and why standards of conduct
and standards of review diverge in corporate law. Professor Eisenberg analyzes
the relevant standards of conduct and review that apply in a number of corporate
law contexts. He discusses the reasoning and policies underlying these diverging
standards. Professor Eisenberg explains the basis of most existing standards of
conduct and review and suggests modifications of several others.
INTRODUCTION
r-H IS Article concerns standards of conduct and standards of review
I in corporate law. A standard of conduct states how an actor should
conduct a given activity or play a given role. A standard of review states
the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor's conduct to deter-
mine whether to impose liability or grant injunctive relief.
In many or most areas of law, these two kinds of standards tend to be
conflated. For example, the standard of conduct that governs automo-
bile drivers is that they should drive carefully, ' and the standard of re-
view in a liability claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully.2
Similarly, the standard of conduct that governs an agent who engages in
a transaction with his principal that involves the subject matter of the
agency is that the agent must deal fairly,3 and the standard of review in a
liability claim by the principal against an agent based on such a transac-
tion is whether the agent dealt fairly. 4
The conflation of standards of conduct and standards of review is so
common that it is easy to overlook the fact that whether the two kinds of
standards are or should be identical in any given area is a matter of pru-
dential judgment. Perhaps standards of conduct and standards of review
in corporate law would always be identical in a world in which informa-
* This Article is based on the Robert E. Levine Distinguished Lecture which I gave
at Fordham Law School in 1993. I thank Joe Hinsey, Meir Dan-Cohen, and a number of
my colleagues who attended a colloquium at which I presented an earlier version of this
Article, for their valuable comments.
1. See, e.g., Levesque v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702, 704 (lst Cir.
1987) ("In that jurisdiction, as elsewhere, a driver's duty is to use care which is reason-
able under the circumstances .... "); see also Thomason v. Willingham, 165 S.E.2d 865,
867 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) (stating that a driver has a common law duty to exercise ordi-
nary care).
2. See Levesque, 832 F.2d at 704.
3. See Restatement of Agency § 390 (1933).
4. See id. § 390 cmt. f.
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tion was perfect, the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role
was always commensurate with the incentives for assuming the role, and
institutional considerations never required deference to a corporate or-
gan. In the real world, however, these conditions seldom hold, and the
standards of review in corporate law pervasively diverge from the stan-
dards of conduct. A byproduct of this divergence has been the develop-
ment of a great number of standards of review in this area. In the past,
the major standards of review have included good faith, business judg-
ment, prudence, negligence, gross negligence, waste, and fairness.- An
important new development has been the emergence of intermediate
standards of review.6
Traditionally, the two major areas of corporate law that involved stan-
dards of conduct have been the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The
duty of care concerns the standards of conduct and review applicable to a
director or officer who takes action, or fails to act, in a matter that does
not involve his own self-interest. (I will hereafter refer to such action or
inaction as disinterested conduct.) The duty of loyalty concerns the stan-
dards of conduct and review applicable to a director or officer in taking
action, or failing to act, in a matter that does involve his own self-inter-
est. (I will hereafter refer to such action or inaction as self-interested
conduct.)
Traditionally too, the standards of review in care and loyalty cases
have for the most part been bipolar. At one pole have been standards of
review that are very hard for a plaintiff to satisfy, such as the standards
of waste and business judgment.7 At the other pole have been standards
of review that are easier for a plaintiff to satisfy, such as the standards of
prudence and fairness.8 Partly as a result of new statutory provisions,
and partly as a result of the emergence of new areas of corporate law,
within the last twenty or thirty years the divergence between standards of
conduct and standards of review in corporate law has come increasingly
close to the surface, and in several areas intermediate standards of review
have now evolved to govern important types of conduct.9
In this Article, I develop and examine various standards of conduct
and review in corporate law, and explore the reasons why courts employ
multiple standards of conduct and review and why the standards of con-
duct and review often diverge. In Part I, I consider the duty of care. In
Part II, I consider the duty of good faith. In Parts III, IV, and V, I
consider the duty of loyalty, takeovers, and the termination of derivative
actions, respectively. Finally, in Part VI, I consider the general problem
of why standards of conduct and standards of review diverge.10
5. See infra text accompanying notes 12-50.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65, 86-95.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 13-33, 82.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 41-46, 51-61.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 63-65, 86-95.
10. See generally American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance:
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I. THE DUTY OF CARE
A. Functions and Duties of Directors and Officers
The duty of care of corporate directors and officers is a special case of
the duty of care imposed throughout the law under the general heading
of negligence. All law builds on moral, policy, and experiential proposi-
tions. The law of negligence is no exception. Under the moral and pol-
icy propositions that underlie the law of negligence, if a person assumes a
role whose performance involves the risk of injury to others, he is under a
duty to perform that role carefully and is subject to blame if he falls to do
so. For example, one who assumes the role of driver is under a duty to
drive carefully; one who assumes the role of doctor is under a duty to
practice medicine carefully; one who assumes the role of judge is under a
duty to judge carefully.
Under modem corporate law and practice, the role of officers is to
manage the business of the corporation.1 I Those who assume the role of
director have several fairly distinct functions to perform. Directors must
monitor or oversee the conduct of the corporation's business. Directors
must select, compensate, and replace, as required, the principal senior
executives. Directors must approve, modify, or disapprove the corpora-
tion's financial objectives, major corporate plans and actions, and major
questions of choice concerning the corporation's auditing and accounting
principles and practices. Finally, directors must decide any other mat-
ters that are assigned to the board by law or by a certificate provision or
by-law, or assumed by the board under a board resolution or otherwise.
The general standard of conduct applicable to directors and officers in
the performance of their functions, in relation to matters in which they
are not interested, is set forth in section 4.01 of the ALI's Principles of
Corporate Governance:
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the
director's or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that he or
she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably
be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar
Analysis and Recommendations (Proposed Final Draft 1992) [hereinafter Principles of
Corporate Governance]. I place heavy emphasis throughout this Article on the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance. Although the Principles of Cor-
porate Governance is not titled a Restatement-partly because it includes not only
provisions addressed to courts, but also provisions addressed to legislatures and provi-
sions of corporate practice-it is essentially a Restatement of corporation law in the areas
that I will consider, and therefore provides a useful thread through the maze of compet-
ing standards. Many of the passages in the balance of this Article draw very heavily on,
and sometimes paraphrase, portions of the Comments and Reporter's Notes that address
the issue under consideration. I also have drawn on Melvin A. Eisenberg, Self-Interested
Transactions in Corporate Law, 13 J. Corp. Law 997 (1988) and Melvin A. Eisenberg.
The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors & Officers, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 945 (1990).




This standard of conduct has both subjective and objective elements.
The standard of "care that an ordinarily prudent person would reason-
ably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circum-
stances" is an objective standard. The standard, "in a manner that he or
she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation," is
both subjective and objective. The director or officer must subjectively
believe that his conduct is in the best interests of the corporation, and
that belief must be objectively reasonable.
The application of this standard of conduct to the functions of direc-
tors results in several distinct duties. Directors must reasonably monitor
or oversee the conduct of the corporation's business to evaluate whether
the business is being properly managed, primarily by regularly evaluating
the corporation's principal senior executives and ensuring that appropri-
ate information systems are in place. This is known as the duty to moni-
tor. Directors must follow up reasonably on information, acquired
through monitoring systems or otherwise, that should raise cause for
concern. This is known as the duty of inquiry. Directors must make
reasonable decisions on matters that the board is obliged or chooses to
act upon. Finally, directors must employ a reasonable decision-making
process to make decisions.
Officers have comparable duties, although for most officers decision
making is likely to be more important than monitoring.
B. The Business-Judgment Standard
On their face, the elements of these duties are fairly demanding. This
is particularly true of the element of prudence or reasonability. In prac-
12. Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, § 4.01. Compare § 8.30(a) of
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act:
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exer-
cise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 8.30(a) (1984).
Under § 8.42 of the Model Act, the same standard applies to officers. See id. at § 8.42.
Comparable standards are found in case law. See Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 895 (10th
Cir. 1986) (Oklahoma law); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d
264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986) (New York law); Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir.
1982) (Texas law), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983); Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp.
1149, 1161 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975); Heit v. Bixby, 276 F.
Supp. 217, 230 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Johnson v. Coleman, 20 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Ark. 1929);
Speer v. Dighton Grain, Inc., 624 P.2d 952, 955-56 (Kan. 1981); Dykema v. Muskegon
Piston Ring Co., 82 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Mich. 1957); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432
A.2d 814, 820 (N.J. 1981); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332,
1334 (Utah 1979). Different standards are found in some statutes. See, e.g., Va. Code
Ann. § 13.1-690 (Michie 1993).
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tice, however, the standards of review applied to the performance of these
duties are less stringent, especially when the substance or quality of a
decision-that is, the reasonableness of the decision, as opposed to the
reasonableness of the decision-making process-is called into question.
In such cases, a much less demanding standard of review may apply,
under the business-judgment rule.'3
The business-judgment rule consists of four conditions, and a special
standard of review that is applicable, if the four conditions are satisfied,
in suits that are based on the substance or quality of a decision a director
or officer has made, as opposed to the decision-making process he uti-
lized to arrive at his decision.
The four conditions are as follows:
First, a judgment must have been made. So, for example, a director's
failure to make due inquiry, or any other simple failure to take action-
as opposed to a decision not to act--does not qualify for protection of the
rule. 14
Second, the director or officer must have informed himself with respect
to the business judgment to the extent he reasonably believes appropriate
under the circumstances-that is, he must have employed a reasonable
decision-making process. 5
Third, the decision must have been made in subjective good faith-a
condition that is not satisfied if, among other things, the director or of-
ficer knows that the decision violates the law. 6
Fourth, the director or officer may not have a financial interest in the
subject matter of the decision. 7 For example, the business-judgment
rule is inapplicable to a director's decision to approve the corporation's
purchase of his own property.
If these four conditions are met, then the substance or quality of the
director's or officer's decision will be reviewed, not under the basic stan-
dard of conduct to determine whether the decision was prudent or rea-
sonable, but only under a much more limited standard.
There is some difference of opinion as to how that limited standard
should be formulated. A few courts have stated that the standard is
whether the director or officer acted in good faith.'" It is often unclear,
however, whether good faith, as used in this context, is purely subjective
or also has an objective element.
One of the few places where a definition of good faith is codified is the
Uniform Commercial Code, but even the Code lacks clarity on this point.
The Code's General Provisions (Part I) provide that good faith means
13. See Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, § 4.01(c).
14. See id
15. See id § 4.01(c)(2).
16. See id. § 4.01(c).
17. See id. § 4.01(c)(1).
18. See, eg., In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-89 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, 91,710 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31. 1989).
1993]
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"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."' 9 Although
that definition seems to be subjective, it may not be. A person may be
deemed to act honestly if he acts according to his own best lights, or a
person may be deemed to act honestly only if he acts according to his
own best lights and without transgressing the basic moral standards set
by society. Furthermore, under the Code's Sales provisions (Part II) a
merchant's duty of good faith includes an explicitly objective element-
"the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade."' 20 Similarly, in Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. New York Mercantile
Exchange,21 Judge Friendly held, in a non-Code context, that in deter-
mining whether a person made a decision in good faith it was relevant
whether the decision had rationality.22 "By this," he stated, "we mean
only a minimal requirement of some basis in reason .... Absent some
basis in reason, action could hardly be in good faith even apart from
ulterior motive." 23
Similarly, most courts have not limited the standard of review under
the business-judgment rule to subjective good faith, but instead have em-
ployed a standard that involves some objective review of the quality of
the decision, however limited.24 As William Quillen, formerly a leading
Delaware judge, has stated: "[T]here can be no question that for years
the courts have in fact reviewed directors' business decisions to some
extent from a quality ofjudgment point of view. Businessmen do not like
it, but courts do it and are likely to continue to do it because directors are
fiduciaries. ' 25 Even courts that seem to use the term "good faith" in a
relatively subjective way nevertheless almost always review the quality of
decisions under the guise of a rule that the irrationality of a decision
shows bad faith.26 Courts have adopted an objective element because a
subjective-good-faith standard would depart too far from the general
principles of law that apply to private individuals. Serious problems
would arise if even an irrational business decision was protected solely
because it was made in subjective good faith.
Accordingly, the prevalent formulation of the standard of review
under the business-judgment rule, if the four conditions to that rule have
been satisfied, is that the decision must be rational.27 This rationality
19. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1990).
20. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1990).
21. 735 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1984).
22. See id. at 677.
23. Id. at 678 n.32.
24. See, e.g., Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1211 (5th Cir. 1982); McDonnell v.
American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 491 F.2d 380, 384 (2d Cir. 1974); S. Samuel Arsht &
Joseph Hinsey IV, Codified Standard-Same Harbor But Charted Channel: A Response,
35 Bus. Law. 947, 961 (1980).
25. William T. Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral Principles, 10
Del. J. Corp. L. 465, 492 (1985).
26. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, 91,715 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
27. See Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, § 4.01 (c)(3); see also Mey-
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standard of review is much easier to satisfy than a prudence or reasona-
bility standard. To see how exceptional a rationality standard is, we need
only think about the judgments we make in everyday life. It is common
to characterize a person's conduct as imprudent or unreasonable, but it is
very uncommon to characterize a person's conduct as irrational. Unlike
a subjective-good-faith standard, a rationality standard preserves a mini-
mum and necessary degree of director and officer accountability. Fur-
ther, a rationality standard allows courts to enjoin directors and officers
from taking actions that would waste the corporation's assets.
An obvious example of a decision that fails to satisfy the rationality
standard is a decision that cannot be coherently explained. For example,
in Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. ofAmerica,28 managers poured a corpo-
ration's funds into the development of a single plant even though they
knew the plant could not be operated profitably because of various fac-
tors, including lack of a railroad siding and proper storage areas.2 9 The
court imposed liability, because the managers' conduct "defie[d] explana-
tion; in fact, the defendants have failed to give any satisfactory explana-
tion or advance any justification for [the] expenditures."3
In the balance of this Article, I refer to the standard of review that is
applied if the conditions of the business- judgment rule are satisfied as the
business-judgment standard. Under this standard, a director or officer
will not be liable for a decision that resulted in a loss to the corporation,
even if the decision is unreasonable, as long as the conditions of the busi-
ness-judgment rule have been met and the decision is rational.
Although a rationality standard of review is more demanding of a di-
rector than a subjective-good-faith standard of review, it is considerably
less demanding than the relevant standard of conduct, which is based on
reasonableness. Why should such a relatively undemanding standard of
review be applicable to the quality of decisions by corporate directors
and officers? The answer to this question involves considerations of both
fairness and policy.
To begin with, the application of a reasonableness standard of review
to the quality of disinterested decisions by directors and officers could
result in the unfair imposition of liability. In paradigm negligence cases
involving relatively simple decisions, such as automobile accidents, there
is often little difference between decisions that turn out badly and bad
decisions. In such cases, typically only one reasonable decision could
have been made under a given set of circumstances, and decisions that
turn out badly therefore almost inevitably turn out to have been bad
decisions.
ers, 693 F.2d at 1210-11; Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 24, at 954 (noting that "a belief
which motivates a director who is acting in good faith to approve a matter must, aforti-
ori, be one that is held on a reasonable or rational basis").
28. 224 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1966).
29. See Selheimer, 224 A.2d at 639.
30. Id at 646.
1993]
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In contrast, in the case of business decisions it may often be difficult
for factfinders to distinguish between bad decisions and proper decisions
that turn out badly. Business judgments are necessarily made on the ba-
sis of incomplete information and in the face of obvious risks, so that
typically a range of decisions is reasonable. A decision maker faced with
uncertainty must make a judgment concerning the relevant probability
distribution and must act on that judgment. If the decision maker makes
a reasonable assessment of the probability distribution, and the outcome
falls on the unlucky tail, the decision maker has not made a bad decision,
because in any normal probability distribution some outcomes will inevi-
tably fall on the unlucky tail.
For example, an executive faced with a promising but expensive and
untried new technology may have to choose between investing in the
technology or forgoing such an investment. Each alternative involves
certain negative risks. If the executive chooses one alternative and the
associated negative risk materializes, the decision is "wrong" in the very
restricted sense that if the executive had it to do all over again he would
make a different decision, but it is not a bad decision. Under a reasona-
bleness standard of review, however, factfinders might too often errone-
ously treat decisions that turned out badly as bad decisions, and unfairly
hold directors and officers liable for such decisions.
The business-judgment rule protects directors and officers from such
unfair liability by providing directors and officers with a large zone of
protection when their decisions are attacked. Other kinds of decision
makers who must make decisions on the basis of incomplete information
and in the face of obvious risks can often shield themselves from liability
for decisions by showing that they followed accepted protocols or prac-
tices.31 In contrast, directors and officers can seldom shield themselves
in that way, because almost every business decision is unique. Further-
more, unlike most types of negligence cases, negligent decisions by direc-
tors or officers characteristically involve neither personal injury nor
economic damages that are catastrophic to an individual. The law may
justifiably be less willing to take the risk of erroneously imposing liability
in such cases.
Furthermore, the shareholders' own best interests may be served by
conducting only a very limited review of the quality of directors' and
officers' decisions. It is often in the interests of shareholders that direc-
tors or officers choose the riskier of two alternative decisions, because the
expected value of a more risky decision may be greater than the expected
value of the less risky decision. For example, suppose that Corporation
C has $100 million in assets. C's board must choose between Decision X
31. See, e.g., Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 5 Cal. App. 4th 234, 278 n.13
(Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that medical practitioners have this defense available be-
cause "compliance with accepted practice is generally taken as conclusive evidence of due
care.") (quoting Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand.
L. Rev. 549, 560 (1959)).
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and Decision Y. Each decision requires an investment of $I million. De-
cision X has a 75% likelihood of succeeding. If the decision succeeds, C
will gain $2 million. If it fails, C will lose its $1 million investment.
Decision Y has a 90% chance of succeeding. If the decision succeeds, C
will gain $1 million. If it fails, C will recover its investment. It is in the
interest of C's shareholders that the board make Decision X, even though
it is riskier, because the expected value of Decision X is $1.25 million
(75% of $2 million, minus 25% of $1 million) while the expected value
of Decision Y is only $900,000 (90% of $1 million). If, however, the
board was concerned about liability for breaching the duty of care, it
might choose Decision Y, because as a practical matter it is almost im-
possible for a plaintiff to win a duty-of-care action on the theory that a
board should have taken greater risks than it did. A standard of review
that imposed liability on a director or officer for unreasonable as opposed
to irrational decisions might therefore have the perverse incentive effect
of discouraging bold but desirable decisions.32 Putting this more gener-
ally, under an ordinary standard of care directors might tend to be un-
duly risk-averse, because if a highly risky decision had a positive outcome
the corporation but not the directors would gain, while if it had a nega-
tive outcome the directors might be required to make up the corporate
loss. The business-judgment rule helps to offset that tendency.
Furthermore, at least in the case of non-management directors, liabil-
ity for the losses caused by an imprudent business decision would often
be far out of proportion to the incentives for accepting a directorship.
Outside directors of publicly held corporations typically earn approxi-
mately $30,000 annually in directors' fees. In contrast, liability for an
imprudent decision can be in the millions.33 Therefore, in the absence of
some brake on such liability, it might become more difficult to attract
qualified candidates as non-management directors, which also would be
contrary to the shareholders' own best interests.
C. Standards of Validity
Most of the justifications for the business-judgment rule center on lia-
bility consequences: in particular, on the potential unfairness of impos-
ing liability for a good decision that turned out badly; on the perverse
incentive effects that might result from a reasonability standard of review
in liability cases; and on the disproportion between the potential liability
for making an imprudent decision and the incentives for serving as an
32. To some extent this may also be true of other areas, such as medical malpractice.
However, a physician normally can insulate himself in cases that involve significant but
desirable risks by obtaining the patient's informed consent. In contrast, it is normally
neither feasible nor desirable for directors or officers to try to obtain the shareholders'
consent to proposed business decisions.




outside director.34 Insofar as the business-judgment rule rests on these
liability-centered justifications, it would be theoretically possible to apply
a different standard of review when the issue is not whether to impose
personal liability on a director or officer on the basis of disinterested con-
duct, but whether to uphold the validity of a disinterested decision if only
injunctive relief is sought.
Joseph Hinsey has argued for just such a distinction,3" and there is at
least modest support in the case law for employing different standards of
review in these two types of cases. A long line of Delaware decisions has
held that an arm's-length combination of corporations is subject to judi-
cial review to determine whether the price is so grossly inadequate as to
amount to "constructive fraud."36 This rule was applied in a striking
manner by then-Chancellor Quillen in Gimbel v. Signal Companies.37
Signal Companies had agreed to sell its stock in a wholly owned subsidi-
ary, Signal Oil, to Burmah Oil for a price in excess of $480 million. Ne-
gotiations between Burmah and Signal representatives began in October
1973. Before then, independent petroleum geologists had valued Signal
Oil's oil and gas reserves at $230-260 million as of June 30, 1973, and an
expert in oil properties had valued the petroleum properties at $350 mil-
lion as of September 13, 1973. A special meeting of Signal's board was
called to consider Burmah Oil's offer for Signal Oil. Despite the inter-
vening oil crisis, no updated evaluation of Signal Oil's oil and gas
reserves was presented, and no effort was made to determine if other
companies would offer a higher price. The court ordered a temporary
injunction against the sale, although it seems doubtful that liability
would have been imposed on the directors if a suit for damages after the
sale had been completed.38
34. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
35. See Joseph Hinsey IV, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Cor-
porate Governance Project: the Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
609, 611-12 (1984).
36. See Gimbel v. Signal Companies, 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), aff'd per curiam on
limited grounds, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
37. Id.
38. The court said:
although the language of 'constructive fraud' or 'badge of fraud' has frequently
and almost traditionally been used, such language is not very helpful when
fraud admittedly has not been established. There are limits on the business
judgment rule which fall short of intentional or inferred fraudulent misconduct
and which are based simply on gross inadequacy of price.
Id. at 610. The court framed the issue in the case to be, "did the Signal directors act
recklessly in accepting a wholly inadequate price for Signal Oil?" Id. at 611. It pointed
out that:
There is no question that the energy crisis has created a drastic change in the
value of oil and gas properties. Even granting that there may be wide diver-
gence in expert viewpoint, the situation made desirable an updated evaluation
since the Hill evaluation as of September 30 and the De Golyer and MacNaugh-
ton evaluation as of June 30.
Id. at 615. After stressing that "the ultimate question is not one of method but one of
value," the court concluded:
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Despite the ruling in Gimbel, it is not clear that the employment of
different standards of review in liability and validity contexts has caught
hold in the context of ordinary business decisions. The lack of enthusi-
asm for such a distinction in that context may be based on the difficulty
of reviewing the quality of business judgments, on respect for the value of
institutional autonomy when directors have acted in a disinterested man-
ner, or on a hesitation to formulate yet one more finely graded standard
of review. However, as I will show in Part IV, the ALI's Principles of
Corporate Governance does draw a distinction between liability and valid-
ity cases in the extraordinary context of takeovers.39
D. The Due-Care Standard
The justifications of the business-judgment rule help explain why the
business-judgment standard is generally applicable to a review of the
quality of decisions, but not to a review of the duty of monitoring, the
duty of inquiry, or the duty to employ a reasonable decision-making
process.
For one thing, although the law should not discourage directors and
officers from making bold decisions, it should encourage directors and
officers to pay attention to their duties.
For another, a review of whether a director or officer has complied
with the monitoring and process aspects of his role-such as attending
meetings, reading reports, and doing his homework-will usually be sub-
ject to less risk of error than a review of whether a decision that the
director or officer made was reasonable."
More broadly, a review of the quality of directors' and officers' deci-
sions would typically involve, among other things, a determination of
what risk levels the corporation should have accepted and what risks it
should have undertaken-a kind of review that would not only be ex-
tremely difficult but would threaten to impinge seriously on corporate
On the basis of affidavits relating to value, the Court has the tentative belief that
plaintiff would have a reasonable prospect of success on the merits since limited
record indicates a gross disparity between the fair market value of Signal Oil on
December 21, 1973 and what the Board of Directors were willing to sell the
company for, namely, $480,000,000. To the extent the scale tips, on the present
record, the nod is to the plaintiff.
Id at 615. The court's order was made effective only on the posting of security by the
plaintiffs, and the court fixed security at $25 million-"an amount which is, as far as I
have been able to determine, without precedent,"--on the ground that if the transaction
was delayed by litigation, Burmah had a right to withdraw from the contract, and such a
withdrawal might cause Signal irreparable harm. Id. at 618. Plaintiffs were unable or
unwilling to post a bond of this magnitude, and the sale was consummated.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
40. However, if the board of directors makes business judgments concerning decision-
making processes, these judgments may be protected by the business-judgment rule if
they satisfy the conditions of that rule, including the "informed" condition of the rule.
This possibility is most likely to be salient when the board makes decisions concerning
what monitoring programs it will employ, and how those programs should function.
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autonomy. In contrast, the general duty to monitor, the duty to make
due inquiry, and the duty to employ a reasonable decision-making pro-
cess typically do not involve such determinations and are therefore con-
sistent with corporate autonomy concerning those determinations.
Finally, the potential liability of a director for failure to comply with
the monitoring and process aspects of his role may seem more commen-
surate with the incentives for serving as a director, and with the degree of
fault involved, than the imposition of such liability on a director who
employed a reasonable decision-making process but arrived at an unrea-
sonable decision.
Accordingly, the duty to monitor, the duty of inquiry, and the duty to
employ a reasonable decision-making process are normally not protected
by the business-judgment rule. Even in the case of these duties, however,
the standard of review may depart somewhat from the relevant standard
of conduct. A few courts have expressed this difference by adopting a
rule that the standard of review in such cases is whether the director was
"grossly negligent.' ' 4 ' The concept of gross negligence, however, is noto-
riously ambiguous, and in practice it is common to find that courts that
purport to apply that standard actually apply a standard that is either
more or less demanding. For example, a gross-negligence standard of
review is often associated with Delaware, but in the famous case of Smith
v. Van Gorkom42 the Delaware court, although purporting to apply that
standard of review, in fact held outside directors to be liable for conduct
that many observers believe did not constitute even ordinary negligence.
Conversely, in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp. ,43 decided after
Smith v. Van Gorkom, Vice-Chancellor Berger stated that the gross-neg-
ligence test did not apply across the board:
The Hunt directors argue that [in] a claim of director neglect ... the
gross negligence standard should be applied for legal and practical
reasons.
I conclude that ordinary negligence is the appropriate standard of
liability in director neglect claims. I am satisfied that... Van Gorkom
did not adopt the gross negligence standard in [such] claims .... 44
Courts that purport to adopt a gross-negligence standard to review the
duty to monitor, the duty of inquiry, or the duty to employ a reasonable
decision-making process, probably do so because the performance of
41. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). An analysis of
gross negligence as intermediate between ordinary negligence and good faith is made in
Frank Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided No-
tion?, 45 S.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming fall 1993).
42. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
43. 13 Del. J. Corp. L. 1210 (Del. Ch. 1987).
44. Id. at 1216-17 (emphasis added). On the flip side, some courts appear to say that
the standard of review in business-judgment cases is gross negligence. In that context, the
gross-negligence standard of review would be unduly strict.
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these duties seldom presents a cut-and-dried issue, and the gross-negli-
gence standard of review emphasizes the importance of leaving a play in
the joints in determining whether the relevant standard of conduct was
satisfied in such cases. A play in the joints, however, is built into the very
concept of due care. For example, in the Rabkin case Vice-Chancellor
Berger stated that even under an ordinary-negligence standard, "corpo-
rate directors will face no liability for the failure to focus on an isolated
bit of information."45
The same point can be made, without using the problematic gross-
negligence standard, by employing the terminology of due care rather
than the terminology of negligence, and by making clear that in deter-
mining whether directors or officers acted with due care, courts should
consider the complexities of the corporate context and give a certain
amount of running room.'
II. THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
It is well established that directors and officers must act in good
faith. 7 Although this standard of conduct is usually treated as an aspect
of the duty of care,4" in fact it is distinct from that duty. For example,
one aspect of the duty of good faith is that a director or officer may not
knowingly cause the corporation to take an action that violates the law,
even if a reasonable person would believe that, balancing all probable
gains and losses, the action would enhance corporate profits.
The duty of good faith has been the subject of only limited analysis,
partly because it often has been folded into the duty of care. A full devel-
opment of the meaning of the duty of good faith, insofar as that duty
goes beyond the obligation not to act in a knowingly illegal manner,
would extend beyond the compass of this Article. I will therefore reserve
that discussion for separate treatment, and point here only to the impor-
tant discussion of that duty in In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Liti-
gation,49 where Chancellor Allen stated that an action by a director is not
in good faith if it is based on "any human emotion [that] may cause a
director to place his own interests, preferences or appetites before the
welfare of the corporation," including "hatred, lust, envy, revenge....
shame or pride."5"
Because the duty to act in good faith is a baseline duty and does not
implicate the issues of risk and the like raised by the duty of care, the
45. Id. at 1216-17.
46. See Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, Part IV Introductory
Note, § 4.01, § 4.01 cmt. e.
47. See id. at § 4.01(a).
48. See id.
49. [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94, 194 at 91,700 (Del. Ch.
Jan 31, 1989).
50. Id at 91,711.
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standard of review for violating that duty should be identical to the stan-
dard of conduct that the duty demands.
III. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
A. The Basic Standard of Conduct and Standard of Review
When a director or officer acts in a manner in which his self interest is
involved, the standard of conduct is that he must act or deal fairly. Like
the standard that governs disinterested decision making, the standard of
fair dealing has both a substantive and a procedural aspect. These two
different aspects are sharply presented in cases involving self-interested
transactions between a director or officer and the corporation. In such
cases, the substantive aspect of fair dealing requires that the terms of the
transaction must be fair5 -meaning, essentially, that the terms the cor-
poration gives or gets should be the terms it would have given or gotten if
it had dealt on the market-and that the transaction must be in the cor-
poration's best interests. The procedural aspect of fair dealing requires
that the transaction and its terms must be arrived at through a fair pro-
cess. For example, the director or officer must make full disclosure con-
cerning the transaction 52 and must explain the implications of the
transaction if he is in a position to realize those implications and the
persons representing the corporation are not.5 3
The disclosure obligation is especially important. A director or officer
who fails to make full disclosure has failed to deal fairly, even if the sub-
stantive terms of a transaction are fair. In many contracts fairness is a
range, rather than a point, and disclosure of a material fact might have
induced the corporation to bargain the price down lower in the range.
Furthermore, the terms of a self-interested contract might be "fair" in
the sense that they correspond to the market terms for the relevant sub-
ject-matter, but the corporation might have refused to make the contract
if disclosure had been made of a material fact that would have shown
that entering into the contract was not in the corporation's interest. This
point is exemplified in Illustration 7 to section 5.02(a)(1) of the Principles
of Corporate Governance:
[X Corporation is seeking a new headquarters building. D, a vice
president of X Corporation, owns all the stock of R Corporation,
which owns an office building. D causes a real estate agent to offer R
Corporation's building to X Corporation. X Corporation's board of
directors agrees to purchase the building for a fair price (that is based
on market conditions)]. D discloses to X Corporation, prior to the
acquisition, his interest in R Corporation. D fails to disclose, however,
that he has information, not publicly available, that the State Highway
Department has formally decided to run a highway through the prop-
51. See Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, § 5.02(a).
52. See id. § 5.02(a)(1).
53. See id. § 5.02 cmt. d.
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erty on which R Corporation's building stands, and to condemn the
building under its power of eminent domain. The price paid by X Cor-
poration is fair, even taking the proposed condemnation into account,
since the condemnation award is likely to equal or exceed the price.
Two weeks after the acquisition, X Corporation learns of the Highway
Department's decision. D has not fulfilled his duty [of fair dealing] to
the corporation .... .4
The obligation to deal fairly when self-interest is involved attaches to a
number of different types of transactions and conduct: transactions with
the corporation that do not involve compensation," transactions that in-
volve compensation,5 6 the taking of corporate opportunities," competi-
tion with the corporation,5" and the use by a director or officer of
corporate position, corporate property, or corporate information for his
own pecuniary advantage.5 9 I will focus here on transactions with the
corporation that do not involve compensation. For convenience, I refer
to such transactions as self-interested transactions.
Suppose that a self-interested transaction has not been approved by
disinterested directors or shareholders. In such cases, the standard of
review is the same as the standard of conduct-whether the director or
officer has dealt fairly, on both the substantive and the procedural
levels.' I will call this the pure-fairness standard. Unlike the due-care
standard, the pure-fairness standard gives virtually no running room, ex-
cept to the extent that it recognizes that fairness is typically a range
rather than a point.6"
It is easy to see why this relatively strict standard of review should be
applied to self-interested transactions. In a perfect market involving ho-
mogeneous goods, there would usually be no reason for a corporation to
transact with a director or senior executive instead of transacting on the
market. Even in imperfect markets involving differentiated goods, there
are probably few instances in which a director or senior executive can
offer the corporation a commodity for which there is no market substi-
tute. Accordingly, such an off-market transaction may properly be re-
garded as exceptional, and therefore in need of a clear justification that it
was fair. For the same reason, the burden of proof is on the director or
senior executive to prove that such an off-market transaction was fair.
B. The Standard of Review When There Has Been Approval by
Disinterested Directors
The issue becomes more complex when a self-interested transaction
54. Id. § 5.02(a)(1), illus. 7.
55. See id § 5.02.
56. See id § 5.03.
57. See id. § 5.05.
58. See id § 5.06.
59. See id. § 5.04.
60. See id. § 5.02.
61. See id. § 5.02(a)(2)(A) cmt.
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has been approved by disinterested directors. Certainly in such cases
there must be a review for full disclosure, because the approval of the
disinterested directors is meaningless without full disclosure. The more
difficult issue is whether the approval changes the standard of review of
substantive fairness. It is sometimes argued that if disinterested directors
approve a self-interested transaction, and the approval satisfies the condi-
tions of the business-judgment rule, the business-judgment standard of
review should be applied because the board has made a disinterested
decision.
Applying the business-judgment standard of review in these cases
would, however, be inappropriate. 2 To begin with, because of their col-
legial relationships directors are unlikely to treat one of their number
with the degree of wariness with which they would approach transac-
tions with third parties.
Furthermore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to employ a definition of
"disinterested" in corporate law that corresponds with factual objectiv-
ity. A director called upon to approve a self-interested transaction would
be factually objective if he had no significant relationship of any kind,
with either the interested director or officer or the subject matter of the
self-interested transaction, that would be likely to affect his judgment.
Objectivity is, in short, the disinterestedness we expect from a judge. A
proper test for objectivity would therefore be the test applied to recusal of
judges, that is, whether the director's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."63
For corporate-law purposes, however, it is desirable to define inter-
estedness in a bounded manner, to include only financial and close famil-
ial relationships, because a corporate-law definition that turned on
objectivity or impartiality would seriously diminish the protection af-
forded by the business-judgment rule. The business-judgment rule pro-
tects only directors who are defined as disinterested. If the corporate-law
definition of disinterestedness corresponded to objectivity or impartiality,
the protection of the business-judgment rule would be undesirably with-
held from a director who had no financial or close familial ties to a party
to a transaction but nevertheless had relationships of a sort that would be
likely to affect his impartiality. For example, if a judge is a long-time
friend of a party and was the maid of honor at her wedding, the judge
should recuse herself, because her impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned. If a director had such a relationship, however, we would not
want to label her "interested" for corporate-law purposes and thereby
remove the protection of the business-judgment rule.
In practice, therefore, for corporate-law purposes interestedness is de-
fined in a bounded way, to include only certain kinds of interestedness.
For example, under section 1.23 of the Principles of Corporate Govern-
62. See id. § 5.02.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
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ance a director or officer is "interested" in a transaction if, for example,
he has "a material pecuniary interest in the transaction" or has a "busi-
ness, financial, or familial relationship with a party to the transaction,
and that relationship would reasonably be expected to affect [his] judg-
ment with respect to the transaction in a manner adverse to the corpora-
tion."" Because directors who are disinterested under the bounded
corporate-law definition may nevertheless not be factually objective, the
law should require a fairness review even of self-interested transactions
that have been approved by "disinterested" directors.
Finally, the realities of director action must be taken into account.
The board of a publicly held corporation seldom formulates decisions in
the first instance. Instead, when board decisions are required, the board
normally acts by approving, rejecting, or modifying a proposal that has
been formulated and recommended by the principal senior executives.
Furthermore, a board can be expected to have great confidence in, and
place great reliance on, such recommendations, because if the board does
not have a high level of confidence in the principal senior executives, it
should already have replaced them. Consequently, at least in those cases
in which the board is called upon to approve a self-interested transaction
involving principal senior executives, the board's sole source of advice
may be the proponent of the transaction. In short, unlike the typical
business decision, in determining whether to approve a self-interested
transaction involving principal senior executives, disinterested directors
may receive only self-interested advice.
A review of the substantive fairness of a self-interested transaction that
has been approved by disinterested directors can also be thought of as a
surrogate for a review of the fairness of the process by which those direc-
tors approved the transaction. In a world with perfect information, a
court could always determine directly whether disinterested directors
who approved a self-interested transaction approached the transaction
with the appropriate degree of wariness, whether they were factually ob-
jective, whether they had proper advice, and so forth. Because we do not
live in such a world, courts may need to make these determinations by
indirect means. If a self-interested transaction that has been authorized
by disinterested directors is substantively unfair, courts can normally in-
fer that the approving directors were not objective in fact, that they were
not as wary as they should have been because they were dealing with a
colleague, or that they did not have good advice.
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to give some weight to the approval of
disinterested directors, both on the ground of institutional autonomy,
and because if such approval provides some insulation against liability,
interested directors and officers will have a strong incentive to bring pro-
posed self-interested transactions before disinterested directors at an
64. Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, §§ 123(a)(2)-(a)(3); see also
§§ 123(a)(1), 123(a)(4) (listing other facts that would make a director "interested").
123(c) (definition of "interested directors" in the context of derivative actions).
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early stage. These objectives can be accomplished by adopting an inter-
mediate standard of review, rather than a pure-fairness test, when a self-
interested transaction has received such approval. Under section 5.02 of
the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, for example, if disinter-
ested directors properly approve a self-interested transaction, the plaintiff
rather than the defendant bears the burden of proof, and the standard of
review is whether disinterested directors could have reasonably believed
that the transaction was fair to the corporation.65 This standard is in-
tended to be easier for the interested director or officer to satisfy than a
pure-fairness standard but harder to satisfy than the business-judgment
standard. The intermediate standard of review of self-interested transac-
tions that have been properly approved by disinterested directors accom-
modates both the need to make self-interested transactions reviewable for
fairness, on the one hand, and the value of institutional autonomy and
the desirability of providing self-interested directors and officers with an
incentive to seek early approval from disinterested directors, on the
other.
C. The Effect of Conflict-of-Interest Statutes
Since the 1950s, most states have adopted conflict-of-interest statutes
concerning the effect of approval of self-interested transactions by disin-
terested directors.6 6 Although the statutes vary in important ways,
67
they typically provide that a transaction will not be void or voidable
solely because it is self-interested if it is fair or if disinterested directors
approve it.68
Some of these statutes explicitly require a fairness review even if a
transaction was approved by disinterested directors. 69 The remaining
statutes are susceptible to two very different interpretations. On the one
hand, they can be interpreted to mean that approval by disinterested di-
rectors is an alternative to a fairness review.7° On the other, they can be
interpreted as intended merely to change the common law rule that self-
interested transactions are voidable without regard to fairness, and not to
preclude a review for fairness. Thus, in adopting section 41 of the prior
version of the Model Act7 '-on which a number of the state statutes are
based7 2-the ABA's Committee on Corporate Laws stated that "[t]he
function of section 41 is not to provide a basis for validating for all pur-
65. See Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, § 5.02.
66. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
67. Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (1991) with Cal. Corp. Code § 310 (West.
1990) and N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713 (Consol. 1983).
68. The statutes also apply to approval by disinterested shareholders. See, e.g., Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
69. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 310 (West 1990).
70. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (1991), as interpreted in Marciano v.
Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) (dictum).
71. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 41 (1971).
72. See Model Business Corp. Act Ann. at 1142.42-2 (1993).
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poses a contract or transaction between an interested director and his
corporation, but simply to establish that such contract or transaction is
not automatically void or voidable solely by reason of the director's inter-
est," and that "[i]n all other respects equitable principles will continue to
be applicable. '7
3
Although courts have come down on both sides of the issue, 4 it is
widely understood that, statute or no statute, approval of a self-interested
transaction by disinterested directors will not prevent a court from ap-
plying to self-interested transactions a "smell" test that is more rigorous
than the business judgment rule. At a minimum, such a test can be im-
ported into the statutes through the concept of good faith. Many of the
statutes explicitly require approval by disinterested directors to be in
good faith. 5 Furthermore, since directors are always obliged to act in
good faith76 such a requirement can be implied even where it is not ex-
plicit. Because good faith can be given an objective as well as subjective
content, 7 this good faith requirement allows a judicial inquiry into fair-
ness, since the courts can hold that a transaction that is clearly unfair
cannot be approved in good faith.
Similarly, although a new version of the Model Act's conflict-of-inter-
est provisions, 8 which has been adopted in several states,79 provides that
a director's self-interested transaction may not be attacked if the transac-
tion is properly approved by disinterested directors,80 an important pas-
sage of the Comment adds that terms of a transaction that are
"manifestly unfavorable" to the corporation could constitute probative
73. Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 41 cmt. (1971).
74. Compare Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 740-41 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that,
under New York statute, ratification of a transaction by disinterested directors or by
shareholder vote can relieve a director of the burden of proving that a transaction was
fair and shift the burden to the challenging party, who must show that the transaction
was unfair) and Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (holding that statute does not automatically validate transactions
because of disclosure and approval by majority of shareholders) and Holi-Rest, Inc. v.
Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Iowa 1974) (holding that Iowa statute does not modify its
common law rule which requires a corporation-controlling director, challenged in a self-
dealing transaction, to carry the burden to establish fairness) and Aronoff v. Albanese, 85
A.D.2d 3, 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (stating that, under New York law, ratification shifts
the burden of proof of fairness to the opponents of the transaction, but does not automati-
cally validate the transaction) with Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del.
1987) (dictum) (approval by fully informed disinterested directors or shareholders per-
mits invocation of the business judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or
waste with burden of proof on the party attacking the transaction) and Citron v. E.I.
Dupont de Nemours & Company, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) rl 95,420 at 97,125 (Del. Ch.
1990) (dictum) (quoting with approval Marciano, 535 A.2d at 405 n.3).
75. See, eg., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
78. See Model Business Corp. Act Ann. §§ 8.60-8.63 (1993).
79. See Model Business Corp. Act Ann. at 1142.26 (1993).
80. See Model Business Corp. Act Ann. §§ 8.61, 8.62 (1993).
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evidence that the directors' action did not constitute proper approval. 8'
This "manifestly unfavorable" test, like the smell test, is essentially an
implicit intermediate test, comparable to the explicit test of section 5.02
of the Principles of Corporate Governance. The explicit standard of sec-
tion 5.02, which is intended to serve as a guide to interpretation of the
statutes as well as a statement of the law applicable when the statutes do
not apply, is preferable to the tacit smell test or the implicit intermediate
standard of the Model Act, because it promotes transparency of decision
making by allowing the courts to do explicitly what all agree they will
find some way to do in any event.
D. The Standard of Review When There Has Been Approval by
Disinterested Shareholders
Suppose now that a self-interested transaction has been approved by
disinterested shareholders? In such cases, plausible arguments can be
made for several very different standards of review.
Self-interested transactions are likely to involve matters that would
constitute ordinary business transactions were it not for the self-interest
involved, and amounts of money that are relatively small compared to
the corporation's total value. Therefore, it is hard to be confident that
shareholders who are sent a proxy statement that includes a proposal for
the approval of such a transaction will both study and fully understand
the relevant issues. Accordingly, at least in the case of a publicly held
corporation, a very forceful argument can be made that shareholder ap-
proval of self-interested transactions should not be given any weight at
all, or at most should only serve to shift the standard of review from a
full-fairness standard to an intermediate standard.
At the other extreme, it can be argued that if full disclosure is made,
approval of self-interested decisions by disinterested shareholders should
be conclusive and unreviewable, partly because the shareholders own the
corporation, and partly because, at least in the publicly held corporation,
disinterested shareholders will normally have no relations whatsoever to
the self-interested director or officer and therefore will be factually
objective.
Still another alternativeis to review self-interested decisions that have
been approved by disinterested directors under the standard of waste.
That standard has been variously defined. As formulated in section 1.42
of the Principles of Corporate Governance, which is generally congruent
on the issue with Delaware law,
[a] transaction constitutes a 'waste of corporate assets' if it involves an
expenditure of corporate funds or a disposition of corporate assets for
which no consideration is received in exchange and for which there is
no rational business purpose, or, if consideration is received in ex-
change, the consideration the corporation receives is so inadequate in
81. See Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 8.61 cmt. 2 (1993).
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value that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would deem
it worth that which the corporation has paid. 82
The waste standard is a counterpart of the business-judgment standard.
The argument for this standard is that it accommodates the competing
concepts in this area-on the one hand, the concepts that shareholders
are the owners of the corporation and that disinterested shareholders are
factually objective, and on the other hand, the concept that the limita-
tions of proxy voting prevent shareholder approval of a self-interested
transaction from being meaningful.
E. Standard of Review in Compensation and Corporate Opportunity
Cases
It would be tedious to discuss the standard of review that should gov-
ern every permutation of self-interested conduct, and I shall therefore
consider only two further cases.
The first of these cases consists of self-interested transactions that in-
volve compensation. Compensation transactions differ from other self-
interested transactions in important respects. Because the appropriate
amount of compensation depends heavily on each manager's individual
characteristics, it is difficult to find market equivalents to measure the
substantive fairness of compensation. Also, unlike other self-interested
transactions, in the case of compensation no justification is needed to
explain why the corporation chose to deal with an insider, rather than
transacting with a third party on the open market. Perhaps for these
reasons, the cases hold that if a compensation transaction has been prop-
erly approved by disinterested directors it will be reviewed only under a
business-judgment standard.83 In the absence of approval by disinter-
ested directors or shareholders, however, compensation transactions
must satisfy the pure-fairness standard of review.
The second case is that in which a director or senior executive takes a
corporate opportunity after the opportunity has first been offered to the
corporation and rejected by disinterested directors. In the case of a self-
interested transaction with the corporation, substantive fairness can be
determined by comparing the terms of the transaction with the terms of
comparable market transactions. In contrast, when disinterested direc-
tors reject a corporate opportunity-because, for example, it is unsuita-
ble for the corporation or insufficiently profitable to justify the
82. Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, § 1.42. See Grobow v. Perot,
539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988); see also Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del.
1979) (a transaction constitutes waste when its terms are such that "'no person of ordi-
nary sound business judgment would say that the consideration received ... was a fair
exchange for [what was given by the corporation]' ") (quoting Kaufman v. Schoenberg,
91 A.2d 786, 791 (Del. Ch. 1952)).
83. See Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1979); Teich v. National Castings
Co., 201 F. Supp. 451, 456-57 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Principles of Corporate Governance,
supra note 10, § 5.03(a)(2); cf. Coleman v. Plantation Golf Club, Inc., 212 So.2d 806, 808
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Fulton v. Talbert, 120 S.E.2d 410, 411 (N.C. 1961).
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investment required-there is no objective benchmark, like a market,
against which to measure whether the corporation should have accepted
the opportunity. To put this differently, a court can override a decision
of disinterested directors concerning the fairness of a transaction with a
director or officer, without making a business judgment, simply by deter-
mining and comparing the terms offered in the market. In contrast, a
court could override the decisions of disinterested directors concerning
whether the corporation should have taken a corporate opportunity only
by making a complex business judgment-after gaining an understanding
of the corporation's finances and business policies, plans, and goals-
whether the probable benefits of the opportunity to the corporation justi-
fied the opportunity's probable costs.
Given the difficulty of such a judgment, if an opportunity was offered
to the corporation, with full disclosure, and disinterested directors deter-
mined that the corporation should reject the opportunity, a director
should not be held liable unless the conditions of the business-judgment
rule were not met or the business-judgment standard of review was not
satisfied.8 4 Generally speaking, however, a director or senior executive
cannot take a corporate opportunity without first offering it to the corpo-
ration. Furthermore, if a director or officer offers the opportunity to the
corporation, and it is rejected, but not by disinterested directors, the di-
rector or senior executive must prove that the rejection was fair.8 5
IV. TENDER OFFERS
Over the last twenty years, corporation law has tried to come to grips
with the hostile tender offer-that is, a general offer to purchase all or a
controlling amount of a corporation's shares from the shareholders, over
management's objections. Although such offers are made to the share-
holders, rather than to the corporation, often the board of a corporation
for whose shares a tender offer has been made causes the corporation to
take an action that will tend to block consummation of the offer.
The standard of conduct that should govern such a blocking action is
that the action should be reasonably designed to advance the best inter-
ests of the corporation and the shareholders.8 6 The standard of review
presents a more complex problem. If a tender offer succeeds, the top
managers will normally lose their jobs. Therefore, actions to block
tender offers resemble self-interested conduct. Usually, however, block-
ing actions are authorized by outside directors, not by managers, and
unlike managers, who typically stand to lose their jobs if the takeover
succeeds, outside directors ordinarily have no significant economic self-
interest in blocking a tender offer. Blocking actions also differ from most
other self-interested actions in other respects. Unlike a self-interested
84. See Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, § 5.05(a)(3)(B).
85. See id. § 5.05(c).
86. See id. § 6.02(b)(1).
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transaction, a blocking action may be beneficial to shareholders even if it
is taken for the wrong reasons. Because of the obstacles to shareholder
collective action in publicly held corporations, it may be desirable for the
board to take a blocking action whose effect is to facilitate an auction
that will maximize the tender-offer price, regardless of the board's moti-
vation. Moreover, a tender offer is typically a highly complex business
transaction, and shareholders will often need management's expertise to
evaluate the offer.
The resolution of these conflicting factors suggests a split in the stan-
dards of review in injunctive and liability settings. In an injunctive set-
ting a blocking action should be reviewed under an intermediate
standard even if it has been approved by disinterested directors, because
in evaluating a tender offer directors usually rely very heavily on advice
from principal senior executives, and these recommendations are self-in-
terested. Accordingly, just as traditional self-interested transactions
should be reviewed under an intermediate standard even if they have
been approved by disinterested directors, so too should an intermediate
standard apply to a decision to block a tender offer even if the decision is
made by disinterested directors.
Some cases have applied an intermediate standard of review to block-
ing actions by treating such actions in terms of the duty of loyalty if the
action was motivated by the directors' desire to entrench themselves in
office.87 Similarly, Delaware has adopted an intermediate standard of
review under which directors who take a blocking action must show that
they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate pol-
icy and effectiveness existed, and that their blocking action was a reason-
able response to the threat posed." Section 6.02(a) of the Principles of
Corporate Governance also adopts an intermediate standard of review in
the case of suits for injunctive or other equitable relief. The test under
section 6.02(a) is, essentially, whether the directors' action was a reason-
able response to the offer.89
There are good reasons, however, for not applying that standard of
review in a liability setting. If an intermediate standard of review was
applied in the takeover context in liability cases, directors might be reluc-
tant to act on the shareholders' behalf in resisting a tender offer, for fear
of liability. Moreover, as a practical matter injunctive actions are the key
legal setting in takeover contests. If the standard of review was the same
in injunctive and liability settings, in actions for injunctive relief the
87. See eg., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984);
Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Minstar Acquiring
Corp. v. AMF, Inc., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) r 92,066
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,863 (D.C. Cal. 1975).
88. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180
(Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); AC
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986).
89. See Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, § 6.02(a).
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courts would often be under pressure to permit a transaction to stand
simply because the alternative would also entail very substantial personal
liability for the directors. In contrast, when the standards of review in
injunctive and liability settings are split, in an injunctive action a court
can focus on whether a blocking action is reasonable without being dis-
tracted by concern over the liability implications of its decision. In the
takeover context, therefore, the Principles of Corporate Governance fol-
lows a line it could have taken, but did not, in the context of ordinary
business decisions, and applies an intermediate standard of review to va-
lidity issues but a business-judgment standard of review to liability
issues.90
V. REMEDIES
A critical area in corporate law is the role and power of the board in
derivative actions. The standard of conduct in this area is that the board
should act with due care and in the interests of the corporation. The
central question is the standard of judicial review that should be applied
to a board determination that a derivative action should not proceed.
This issue may arise in several contexts. One of these contexts con-
cerns the effect of the board's rejection of a shareholder's demand to
bring such an action. The standard of review governing such a rejection
should generally be congruent with the standard of review that would
apply to the underlying transaction that is the subject of the demand-
otherwise, the latter standard could be seriously undercut. Therefore, if
the underlying transaction would be reviewed under the business-judg-
ment standard, that standard of review should also apply to the rejection.
On the other hand, if the underlying conduct would be reviewed under a
more demanding standard, so should the board's rejection of a demand
to bring an action based on that conduct. Accordingly, in the latter type
of case an intermediate standard of review should be applied-that the
plaintiff has pleaded with particularity facts that raise a significant pros-
pect that disinterested directors could not reasonably have determined
that rejection of the demand was in the best interests of the corporation.
This position is taken in section 7.04 of the Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance.9" Although the case law on the issue is somewhat confused and
not well articulated,92 section 7.04 probably reflects what the courts have
actually done.
Suppose, however, that the board does not reject a demand, or that the
board cannot effectively reject a demand because there is not a majority
of disinterested directors capable of objective judgment in the circum-
stances, or that a majority of disinterested directors rejects a demand but
the rejection does not meet the relevant standard of review. In such
90. See id. § 6.02(a), (c).
91. See Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, § 704.
92. See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 210 (Del. 1991).
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cases, the board, acting through disinterested directors, can investigate
the complaint and, if it concludes that prosecution of the action is against
the corporation's best interests, can move that the complaint be dis-
missed on that ground. Again, the standard of review of the board's de-
termination should be congruent with the standard of review that would
apply to the underlying transaction. If the underlying transaction would
be governed by the business-judgment rule, the standard of review of the
board's determination should be the business-judgment standard. If a
more demanding standard of review would apply to the underlying trans-
action, an intermediate standard of review should apply to the board's
determination.
This position is taken in the Principles of Corporate Governance:
Under section 7.10, if the underlying transaction would be reviewed
under an intermediate standard or the pure-fairness standard, the stan-
dard of review of a board determination is that the board must have been
adequately informed under the circumstances and must have reasonably
determined that dismissal was in the best interests of the corporation,
based on grounds that the court deems to warrant reliance.93 As in the
case of demand, the case law on this issue is varied and inconsistent.
Delaware, like the Principles of Corporate Governance, employs a bifur-
cated standard of review, but the bifurcation is along a different line than
that employed in section 7.10. Under the Delaware test, if either (i) a
majority of the board is interested, or (ii) the plaintiff has alleged with
particularity facts that, taken as true, would support a reasonable doubt
that the challenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of
business judgment, then the standard of review is whether the board's
conclusions are soundly based.94 Furthermore, in such cases the court
has discretion to substitute its own business judgment even if the board's
conclusions are soundly based." If neither condition (i) nor (ii) is satis-
fied, then the standard of review is the business-judgment rule. The
meaning of condition (ii) is obscure, but it opens the door to, and virtu-
ally invites, some degree of substantive review even if a majority of the
directors is disinterested. Accordingly, although the Delaware formula-
tion differs from that in section 7.10, in any given case it is likely that a
Delaware court would come to the same result as would a court that
applied section 7.10, and much the same is probably true of non-Dela-
ware courts.
VI. WHY STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
DIVERGE IN CORPORATE LAW
Parts I-V developed the standards of conduct and the standards of
93. See Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, § 7.10. In addition,§ 7.10(b) singles out for special treatment certain violations of the duty of fair dealing
involving the retention of a significant improper benefit.
94. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
95. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981).
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review in corporate law, examined the justifications for the various stan-
dards, and showed how the standards of review and the standards of
conduct pervasively diverge. This divergence raises two related ques-
tions. First, is it meaningful to talk about a standard of conduct that
differs from the standard under which that conduct will be reviewed?
Second, what accounts for the pervasive divergence between the two
types of standards in corporate law?
These questions can best be addressed by setting them in a wider con-
text. The distinction between standards of conduct and standards of re-
view in corporate law is an instance of a more general distinction in the
law between conduct rules, which are rules addressed to the general pub-
lic, and decision rules, which are rules addressed to officials. The kinds
of rules that I call standards of conduct are conduct rules, addressed to
directors and officers. The kinds of rules that I call standards of review
are decision rules, addressed to judges.
The distinction between conduct rules and decision rules, which can be
found in Bentham,96 has been developed and trenchantly analyzed by
Meir Dan-Cohen in his important article, Decision Rules and Conduct
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law.97 Dan-Cohen begins by
pointing out that it is common to take one of two reductionist views
concerning conduct rules and decision rules. Under one of these views
the law consists primarily of decision rules, from which conduct rules are
implied. This view is incorrect, because it obscures the character of law
as a means of social control in general, and as a means of guiding behav-
ior in particular. Under a second reductionist view, the law consists pri-
marily of conduct rules, which are applied or enforced by the courts.
This view is also incorrect, because in deciding a case the judge is not the
addressee or subject of the conduct rule he applies. For example, the
conduct rule that prohibits theft does not regulate the conduct of a judge
who is deciding a theft case. Rather, the conduct of the judge in a theft
case is determined by decision rules concerning how cases in which theft
is alleged should be decided and what sanctions should be imposed on a
person found guilty of theft.98
Dan-Cohen then points out that it may often be desirable to utilize
different contents in linked conduct and decision rules. To make this
point, he suggests that we imagine a world in which officials and the
general public each occupied separate, acoustically sealed chambers, so
that neither group could hear the messages in the rules that the legisla-
ture directed to the other group. Suppose that the legislature of this im-
aginary world was considering whether duress should be a defense to a
charge of crime. As a matter of policy, the legislature might want to
reject a duress defense so to maximize the likelihood that members of the
96. See Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government and an Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation 430 (W. Harrison ed. 1948).
97. 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984).
98. See id. at 628-30.
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society will obey the law. As a matter of compassion or fairness, how-
ever, the legislature might want to recognize the defense.
In a world in which courts and members of the general public could
both perfectly hear-understand-the rules addressed to the other, it
would be difficult for the legislature to avoid choosing between its two
conflicting goals. In the imaginary world of acoustic separation, how-
ever, the legislature could accomplish both of its ends, by telling the gen-
eral public that duress was not an excuse, while telling the courts that it
was.
In the real world, complete acoustic separation is not possible. As a
result, each audience, general public and officials, may hear the rules ad-
dressed to the other. In practice, therefore, conduct rules normally have
decisional side effects and decisional rules normally have conduct side
effects. That is one of the reasons why conduct rules and decision rules
tend to be conflated. Nevertheless, whether the conduct and decision
rules that govern any given issue should be conflated is a matter of pru-
dence, not logic or necessity. Furthermore, under certain conditions
even in the real world there may be a kind of partial acoustic separation,
so that members of the general public may not take full account of deci-
sional rules in deciding how to act.99
In important respects, corporate law presents a textbook case of the
distinction between conduct rules and decisional rules. Some areas of
law, like civil procedure and administrative law, consist almost entirely
of decisional rules. In many other areas, like property and torts, most of
the explicit rules are conduct rules, and decision rules are only implied or
constructed. Corporate law, in contrast, consists of both conduct rules
and relatively explicit decisional rules. This is most obvious in those
cases where the standard of review is dramatically shifted when a given
type of conduct has been approved by a designated corporate organ,
while the standard of conduct remains unchanged. Furthermore, as such
cases illustrate, corporate law is marked by not only an explicit but a
pervasive divergence between the contents of linked conduct and decision
rules.
This returns us to the first of the two questions with which this Part
began: is it meaningful to talk about a standard of conduct that differs
from the standard under which that conduct will be reviewed? More
particularly, in such a case is not the standard of review the standard of
conduct? To put these questions in a somewhat different, affirmative
form, it might be argued that where the standards of conduct and review
diverge in corporate law, the standard of review represents the morality
of duty, while the standard of conduct represents only a morality of aspi-
ration. These questions and this argument, however, are merely forms of
the reductionist view that the law consists primarily of decision rules,
from which conduct rules are implied, and are subject to the criticism
99. See id. at 630-36.
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applicable to that view. Standards of conduct in corporation law are
neither meaningless nor merely aspirational. Rather, they are legal rules
intended to control behavior. In the area of loyalty, for example, the
law's command to directors and officers is the standard of conduct, "deal
fairly when you deal in your own self-interest," not the standard of re-
view, "deal as you need to deal to get approval by your colleagues." Sim-
ilarly, in the area of decision making the law's command is the standard
of conduct, "act with due care," not the standard of review, "make deci-
sions that cannot be characterized as irrational."
Moreover, the standards of conduct have a real bite. Although under
certain conditions the elements of liability under a given standard of re-
view may differ from the elements of liability under a linked standard of
conduct, under other conditions the elements of liability will be the same.
For example, a director who engages in a transaction with the corpora-
tion will be subject to a standard of review that is fully congruent with
the applicable standard of conduct if he either fails to get approval by
disinterested directors or shareholders or if such an approval is not
proper. Similarly, a director who makes a disinterested decision will be
subject to a due-care rather than a rationality standard of review if the
requirements of the business-judgment rule are not satisfied. Accord-
ingly, from the perspective of an actor proposing to engage in certain
conduct, standards of conduct are "safe" rules and standards of review
are "risky" rules. By this I mean that a director or officer who conforms
his conduct to a standard of conduct knows that he is safe from liability
in the absence of judicial error. In contrast, a director or officer who
relies only on a standard of review that is less demanding than the paral-
lel standard of conduct is at risk that the standard of review will be
deemed inapplicable and liability will be imposed under the standard of
conduct.
Finally, legal standards of conduct, containing messages sent by the
legal system, also serve as a foundation for private standards of conduct,
containing messages sent by the private sector. One characteristic pri-
vate-sector form of message consists of legal advice: prudent lawyers
who are asked to give advice to clients concerning a proposed course of
action are likely to give advice based on the rules of conduct, not on the
rules of review. A second important type of private-sector message in the
corporate area consists of codes of conduct adopted by corporations and
circulated to their employees: these codes too are usually based on legal
standards of conduct, not on standards of review.
Granted that the standards of conduct in corporate law are meaningful
legal rules, we are now brought to the question, what accounts for the
pervasive divergence between those standards and the linked standards of
review. In general, the answer to this question turns on the institutional
nature of the corporation, but it is also heavily dependent upon the par-
ticular area in question.
In the area of the duty of care, for example, two kinds of explanation
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can be proposed. One explanation is that the law wants to send directors
and officers a two-part message, as follows: "Your legal duty is to act
with due care. At the same time, we want to give you a certain amount
of running room so that you are not unduly risk averse or otherwise
preoccupied with liability. Therefore, liability will normally be imposed
upon you only if there is a clear variance between the conduct required
by due care and your actual conduct." An alternative explanation-
which is comparable to Dan-Cohen's suggestion concerning the treat-
ment of duress in criminal law-is that to maximize care, the law tells
directors and officers to act with due care, while to take account of fair-
ness (in particular, the difficulty of determining whether a business deci-
sion was reasonable), the law tells the courts to hold directors and
officers liable for a bad judgment only if the judgment was either inter-
ested or in bad faith, the decision maker did not appropriately inform
himself, or the judgment was so bad as to be irrational.
A somewhat different explanation applies to the area of loyalty. Un-
like the duty of care, the divergence between the standards of conduct
and review in the duty of loyalty comes into play only if the relevant
conduct was approved by an independent organ. Accordingly, in this
area corporate law is often concerned with two very different types of
conduct: primary conduct, consisting of an action by a director or of-
ficer, and approving conduct, consisting of approval of that action by an
independent corporate organ, such as the board or the shareholders.
Therefore, the relevant standards may be explained on the basis that the
law is sending one message to the primary actor and another message to
the reviewing organ. The message to the primary actor, which is rela-
tively simple, is that he should follow the relevant standard of conduct.
The message to the reviewing corporate organ, which is more complex, is
as follows:
(1) In deciding whether to approve the conduct of a primary
actor, you should consider his action in light of the stan-
dard of conduct governing the duty of loyalty.
(2) Furthermore, in deciding whether to approve his action
you should conform your own action to the standard of
conduct governing the duty of care.
(3) Whether your approval is given effect will depend upon
whether the primary actor's conduct meets the relevant
standard of review in light of your approval.
The two kinds of messages differ partly because the standards of review
reflects two competing policies-respect for the corporation's institu-
tional autonomy, on the one hand, and concern whether the approving
corporate organ is factually objective and fully informed, on the other. "
100. In theory, the law sends still a third message, to the courts, but in this context the




A more general explanation for the divergence between standards of
conduct and review in corporate law, which cuts across all areas, con-
cerns differential knowledge of legal rules. Although it is common to
assume that individuals act rationally on the basis of full information,'
in fact most actors make decisions on the basis of bounded rationality
involving limited information."0 2 The standards of conduct in corporate
law are for the most part directed to actors engaged in primary conduct.
Such actors cannot be expected either to know all of corporate law or to
consult a lawyer before taking every action. More especially, as a practi-
cal matter complex legal messages are likely to be unavailable to such
actors, in the sense that such messages will tend to be either not heard,
not understood, or not internalized. Accordingly, the legal messages that
are primarily directed to such actors-that is, standards of conduct-
should be simple, so that they can be effectively communicated, and to
the extent possible should reflect social norms of upright business behav-
ior that directors and officers can be expected to know even if they do not
know the law.
In contrast, the standards of review in corporate law are directed pri-
marily to judges, and secondarily to reviewing corporate organs. Judges
either know the law or will be instructed in the law prior to making their
decisions. A corporate organ that is called upon to review an action is in
a position to become instructed in the law by counsel prior to making a
decision. Accordingly, the standards of review may rest on social pro-
positions other than norms of upright business behavior, and correspond-
ingly may be formulated in a more complex manner than standards of
conduct. These considerations apply with special force to actions to
block tender offers, and decisions to reject a demand to bring a derivative
action or to move that such an action be dismissed. The standards of
review in these areas are often very complex. However, unlike ordinary-
course business decisions, decisions by the board to institute a blocking
action are normally taken only with the advice of counsel, because so
much rides on such decisions. Decisions to reject a demand or move to
dismiss a derivative action are also normally taken only with the advice
of counsel, because they involve actual or threatened litigation. The pre-
dictable involvement of counsel in these types of decisions makes the
complexity of the law in these areas acceptable.
Of course, the complex standards of review of corporate law will often
be heard by, and will therefore affect the conduct of, primary actors.
This possibility, however, does not defeat the force of a simplicity/com-
plexity justification in the crafting of standards of conduct and standards
of review. That justification does not turn on the desirability of keeping
standards of review out of the hearing of primary actors. Rather, it turns
on the desirability of reserving complexity in the law for those legal stan-
101. See Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law,
12 Hamline L. Rev. 385, 385-86 (1989).
102. See id. at 386-87.
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dards that are primarily addressed to actors that can deal with legal com-
plexity in making their decisions. Nevertheless, in some areas the
complexity of a standard of review may introduce a kind of partial acous-
tic separation, because a primary actor may be unable fully to internalize
such a standard and understand its operation, and may therefore feel,
and in fact be, safer if he operates only under the simpler standard of
conduct. To the extent that the law wants primary actors to conform to
the standard of conduct, rather than the standard of review, this partial
acoustic separation will itself be desirable.
CONCLUSION
Despite the welter of standards in corporate law, certain organizing
themes emerge. The standards of conduct are relatively simple. In all
areas, directors and officers must act in good faith and in the interests of
the corporation. In addition, where officers or directors are engaged in
disinterested conduct they should act reasonably, and where they are en-
gaged in self-interested conduct they should act fairly.
The standards of review are admittedly more complex, but essentially
they fall into one of three levels-a very demanding level of review, a
very relaxed level of review, and a level of review that is intermediate
between those two extremes. The very demanding standards of review
are good faith and pure fairness. The very relaxed standards of review
are the business-judgment and waste tests. The intermediate standards of
review are those applied to self-interested transactions that have been ap-
proved by disinterested directors, to blocking actions, to board action to
prevent or terminate a derivative action based on conduct that would be
itself reviewable under an intermediate or even more demanding stan-
dard, and to due-care cases that fall outside the ambit of the business-
judgment rule. Although the intermediate standards applicable to each
of these issues are formulated in a manner that reflects differences of nu-
ance between the kinds of cases to which they apply, these differences
should not be allowed to obscure the essential comparability of the vari-
ous intermediate standards. Indeed, the emergence of these intermediate
standards of review has been one of the major recent developments in
corporate law.
Because lawyers tend to focus on the operational questions of liability
and validity, it is easy to overlook the point that standards of review,
which govern liability and validity, are not themselves standards of con-
duct. A director or officer who engages in self-interested conduct with-
out having dealt fairly has acted wrongly, even though he is protected
against liability by the relevant standard of review. A director or officer
who makes an unreasonable decision has acted wrongly, even though he
is protected against liability under the business-judgment rule. If direc-
tors or officers who violate the standards of reasonableness and fairness
sometimes escape liability because of a less demanding standard of re-
view, it is not because they have acted properly, but because utilizing
19931
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standards of review that were fully congruent with the relevant standards
of conduct would impose greater costs than the costs of letting some per-
sons who violated their standards of conduct escape liability. Such an
officer or director may therefore be held accountable, even if not liable,
for failure to meet the relevant standard of conduct.
